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Informality and the Social Art of Mediation: How Pure Mediators 
Create Conditions for Making Peace 
 
Nita Yawanarajah 
Oxford Process, London 
 
Abstract 
This article explores how pure mediators make peace without using political, military, or 
economic leverage. It argues that informality helps mediators establish and build relationships 
that make it possible for the disputing parties to receive their assistance, information, and 
suggestions. The research uses case studies and first-hand interviews to explore beneath the 
institutional and strategic level of analysis and finds that informality manifests in peacemaking 
as informal people, language, time, and space. The findings also indicate that informality in 
peace processes often appeared organically to achieve positive results by default rather than 
design. The research has implications for the study and practice of international mediation, 
particularly for those who mediate without power. This research highlights the need for 
researchers and practitioners to conceptualize peace processes as a mutually reinforcing system 
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Scholarship on peacemaking has long been at odds over the effectiveness of “power 
mediation” and “pure mediation.” Power mediation can push and pull parties to settle by 
increasing the cost and benefit of reaching an agreement with a mix of sanctions and 
enticements.1 Pure mediation, in contrast, involves building relationships with and between 
parties to help address the underlying grievances of a conflict.2 While some favor one style 
over the other, research indicates that the two styles are complementary and serve different but 
essential functions in a peace process.3 Today, a diverse group of actors are classified as “pure 
mediators.”4 States and most nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as well as 
intergovernmental (IGOs) and regional organizations (ROs) are pure mediators when they do 
not impose their power to manipulate disputants into settling their conflicts. 
Research indicates that even without leverage, pure mediators assist disputing parties in 
making peace.5 Using less intrusive and heavy-handed strategies than power mediators, pure 
mediators help the parties by channelling information between them, providing them meeting 
space, establishing rules for their talks, and chairing their meetings.6 Communication strategies 
help mediators break the disputants’ dysfunctional patterns of behavior.7 Mediators’ expertise 
and brainstorming sessions help the disputants consider their options on complex topics.8 
Mediators use facilitation to control the interaction of disputants and move them in more 
productive directions.9 Pure mediators also bridge the information asymmetry in a conflict by 
providing the disputing parties with intelligence that can aid in their decision making.10 While 
mediation literature enumerates the many ways in which mediators can help the parties move 
closer to settling, it does not explain when, where, and why disputants accept a mediator’s 
assistance, information, or suggestions. 
There may be several reasons for this lacuna in knowledge. First, mediation is an activity 
that relies on confidentiality.11 Mediators could lose the parties’ trust by divulging what was 
said or even how it was said. Second, information on the relationship-building elements of pure 
mediation is a challenge to gather. Doing so requires taking the lid off the pot to look at the 
activities that are often conducted in private and obscured by the social contexts within which 
they take place. Journalists and researchers, however, rarely gain the real-time access needed 
to observe the underbelly of a peace process.12 Third, mediation literature largely aggregates 
the mediation efforts at the mediating nation, institution, or organization level and focuses on 
their overall plan or strategy for the mediation effort.13 The informal and behind-the-scenes 
efforts of individual mediators are markedly absent from academic research. Available 
information on the unseen and off-the-record aspects of pure mediation is largely anecdotal 
and is drawn from peacemakers’ biographical accounts and memoirs.14 While these personal 
accounts are interesting to read, drawing generalizable conclusions from such context-specific 
experiences is difficult. Fourth, mediation research has largely neglected the role of the 
peacemaking team.15 While critical to any peace process, their discreet, behind-the-scenes 
efforts have rarely been documented systematically. 
On rare occasions, researchers have had real-time access to peace processes. Their findings 
indicate that the informality of the interactions between the mediation team and the disputing 
parties during peace processes helps to create critical moments that promote relationship 
building.16 Leary calls these critical moments “relational moments” and argues that turning 
points in a peace process often occur during these relational moments.17 Leary’s findings 
coincide with research on critical moments during negotiations, which indicates that 
connecting with the other party and building recognition and trust can be transformative.18 
While these studies point to a relationship between relational moments and turning points, they 
do not provide a theoretical framework for how relationship building occurs during peace 
processes. This gap leads to the principal research question in this paper: How do pure 
mediators establish trusted relationships with the disputing parties during a peace process? This 
research builds on Svensson’s “who” of pure mediation 19 to focus on the “how” of pure 
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mediation. 
I suggest that informality is the currency through which mediators create the atmospheric 
conditions for relational moments to occur in peace processes. Informality is ubiquitous in 
diplomacy. A big part of a diplomat’s life is socializing informally. A diplomat’s calendar is 
often filled with lunches, dinners, and receptions. Diplomats use occasions for sharing food 
and drink to create an environment that promotes familiarity, friendship, and opportunities to 
exchange information with relevant people.20 At the United Nations, diplomats routinely 
negotiate informally. In this article, I explore how informality permeates peace processes, 
helping mediators establish and build relationships of trust that make it possible for the 
disputing parties to be heard and to receive the mediators’ information, messages, and 
suggestions. 
The purpose of this study is to advance knowledge on the practice of pure mediation. The 
article addresses the research gaps identified in the literature by conceptualizing peacemaking 
as a complex process in which the mediation team’s informal interactions complement the lead 
peacemaker’s formal exchanges. The research aims to demystify the mediation team’s hidden 
efforts during a peace process. The article uses three case studies, from Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America, to explore the “how” of pure mediation. Much has been written about these cases. 
Previous research, however, has given limited attention to analyzing the informal efforts 
undertaken during the peace processes. This gap justifies examining how informality 
manifested in and impacted the peace processes. 
The study finds that pure mediators, whether they are international organizations or NGOs 
conducted the peace processes at a formal and an informal level. In particular, research 
indicates that the mediation team members often acted as informal mediators during the peace 
process. This “informal process” helped the lead mediators better understand the disputing 
parties, bridge the divide between them, and forge mutually acceptable outcomes. Findings 
also indicate that the informal process was often conducted intuitively and achieved positive 
results by default rather than by design. 
This article has five sections. The first section draws on previous literature to delineate 
how informality manifests in politics, diplomacy, and peacemaking. The second section 
provides the research design, the third provides a brief description of the cases and a glimpse 
into some of the hidden activities during the peace processes, and the fourth presents the 
findings of the research. The fifth section concludes with some thoughts about how to better 
understand international mediation and increase its efficacy in practice. 
 
A Note on Theory 
This section draws on previous research on diplomacy, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding 
from the fields of social psychology and politics to answer the central question, How do pure 
mediators establish trusted relationships with the disputing parties during a peace process?  
 
Previous Research  
Sociologists define formality as social practices characterized by explicit, usually 
professionally written, ritually accepted, and publicly available rules and regulations.21 
Behavior that follows these fixed codes of conduct is formal behavior. Informal behavior 
avoids, deviates from, or circumvents fixed rules of behavior. Historically, rules emerged to 
regulate the informal patterns of social life. It would be impossible to conceive of social life 
without its informal component. 
“Formal” and “informal” are rarely presented as neutral terms.22 In politics, “formal” 
denotes state and officialdom, legality, and power. “Informal” signifies a lack of official status 
and authority. Informal activity is seen as taking place in opaque spaces where official rules 
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are suspended. It is in these opaque spaces, however, that lobbyist prowl, coalitions are formed, 
favors are traded, and wheeling and dealing occurs. Based on mutual exchanges and favors, 
informal relationships cannot exist in the presence of prying eyes or a clear regulatory 
framework.23 Formality and informality in politics are often presented as a form of duality: 
“proper”’ and “improper,” though the two forms are often mutually beneficial and reinforcing. 
Formal and informal relations are two sides of the same coin in social relations. 
In international affairs, informal agreements permeate nearly all fields.24 According to 
Hardt, informal communication provides privacy to share ideas without accountability.25 In 
informal settings, participants speak freely without fear that they are giving away their 
institution’s official position or that their ideas will be reported by the media the next day. For 
example, at the United Nations, diplomats know that the real negotiations of the Security 
Council are conducted in informal consultations and not in official meetings.26 If diplomacy 
functioned only in the formal sphere, the world would likely be in a state of permanent 
paralysis, leaving diplomats without the ability to move beyond official positions. The formal 
and informal have always been complementary and mutually reinforcing in diplomacy. 
Informality has also permeated the field of conflict resolution through the application of 
contact theory. Contact theory, developed to reduce hostility between adversarial groups, is 
based on the assumption that unfamiliarity and lack of knowledge about another group can 
promote hostility and rivalry.27 The theory posits that increased contact between groups under 
the right conditions can improve intergroup reactions and relations. According to Allport, 
proximity in the right circumstances can lead to improved relations. He highlights four 
conditions that produce positive results: parties must be of equal status, have common goals, 
be free of intergroup rivalry, and be authorized to have contact.28 Studies found that for contact 
to have a positive impact, it must be intimate and not superficial, and it must be among people 
of equal status and take place in natural and comfortable settings as opposed to forced and 
sterile settings.29 Another study that advanced contact theory found that casual contact that 
produces superficial relations does not promote mutual understanding.30 According to Amir, 
for contact to be effective in improving relations and promoting common understanding, casual 
contact must seek a deeper level of acquaintance and a more intimate relationship. It must be 
institutionally sanctioned and be pleasurable and rewarding to the participants.31 Contact theory 
was conceptualized primarily to reduce hostility between rival groups. I posit, however, that 
elements of contact theory can be adapted to help the mediation team build relations with and 
between the parties. 
Kelman advanced the idea that track 2 activities conceptualized as “problem-solving 
workshops” offer the potential for influential people to talk, listen, and explore ideas in 
private.32 These activities allow the disputing parties to challenge each other’s assumptions and 
positions without fear or blame. During these activities, the parties were able to meet each other 
as equals, free from the power imbalances and moral righteousness that has so often blocked 
formal processes. Kelman posited that under the right circumstances, the informal problem-
solving workshop could contribute to the official peace process. 
The idea that there could be an informal track in diplomatic negotiations emerged during 
the Cold War nuclear talks. US Foreign Service officers observed that “private individuals, 
meeting unofficially, can find their way to a common ground when official negotiators can’t.” 
33 An informal track for negotiations was first conceptualized through the interaction between 
the disciplines of international politics and psychology. In 1981, Joseph Montville, a US 
Foreign Service officer, and William D. Davidson, a psychiatrist and president of the Institute 
of Psychology and Foreign Affairs, made the distinction between “official diplomacy” (track 
1) and “unofficial diplomacy” (track 2) in foreign policy.34 Unofficial diplomacy has the 
quality of being informal and unstructured. It is conducted by unofficial actors to create greater 
understanding between them and the groups to which they belong. 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
 5 
In the Montville-Davidson perspective, informal diplomacy is complementary to formal 
diplomatic efforts. The Montville-Davidson idea of a track 2 was to establish an informal and 
unofficial process to the formal and official negotiations. By extrapolation, track 2 as an 
informal process would be equally applicable to peacemaking whether conducted by a track 1 
or a track 2 actor. Mediation literature, however, has lost sight of the real meaning of track 2 
as an informal process conducted by those who are not officially leading the negotiations. 
Instead, current mediation literature presents track 2 as synonymous with mediation conducted 
by NGOs. 
The end of the Cold War turned the attention of practitioners and academics to the 
challenge of making peace in civil wars. Lederach’s academic contribution to conflict 
transformation theory started to deepen the practice of peacemaking. Lederach’s peacebuilding 
pyramidal model divides society into three levels referred to as tracks: top leadership (track 1), 
mid-level leadership (track 2), and leadership at the grassroots level (track 3).35 In what he calls 
a “middle out approach,” Lederach argues that mid-level leaders have the “greatest potential 
for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain peacebuilding over the long-term.”36 
Lederach’s three-level peacebuilding pyramidal model encourages greater emphasis at the mid-
level, because it has the potential to affect the leaders at the elite and grassroots levels. His 
focus on track 2 may have contributed to the growing number of NGOs who direct their efforts 
to the mid-level of society. According to Lederach’s peacebuilding theory, relationships are at 
the heart of social change and social space is seen as the place where relationships are built and 
sustained. Applying, Lederach’s pyramidal model, I suggest that the mid-level members of a 
peacemaking team serve as informal mediators in a peace process. 
Mediating violent conflicts, particularly in civil wars, requires many kinds of expertise. 
After the Cold War, when internal conflicts became more prevalent, a more holistic approach 
to peacemaking emerged. MacDonald and Diamond conceptualized peacemaking as the 
interconnected activities of individuals, communities, and institutions working in multiple 
disciplines.37 In their “multi-track diplomacy” framework, multidisciplinary actors coordinate 
to provide a comprehensive multisectoral systemic approach to the delivery of peace. After the 
publication of MacDonald and Diamond’s research, making peace in civil wars no longer 
remained the exclusive purview of diplomats and statemen. A greater number of technical 
experts are now routinely involved in peacemaking activities. I argue that technical experts 
offer more than their expertise to a peace process. Someone deemed an expert can exert 
considerable sway over the future actions and decisions of a disputing party.38 In this 
connection, experts in a peace process could also act as informal mediators. 
Previous research has shown that building relationships during a peace process requires 
intimate interactions between equals and that this informal process does not stand alone but 
complements the formal process. This framework suggests several research questions to help 
answer the central research question of this article about how pure mediators build relationships 
of trust in peace processes: Who undertakes relationship building during a peace process? What 
kind of activities and interactions support their efforts? What is the relationship between the 
informal and the formal aspects of a peace process?  
 
Concepts and Definitions 
Informality 
In this article, “informality” is defined as the quality of a person or condition that exhibits an 
unofficial style or nature, often demonstrated by a relaxed, friendly, casual, or familiar 
appearance and behavior that is marked by the absence of formality or ceremony. In peace 
processes, the quality of informality is identified by the absence of note-takers and the action 
of note-taking, giving the appearance that the interaction is literally off-the-record. 
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Peace Process 
A “peace process” is an official national-level activity that spans three phases: a pre-negotiation 
phase that is often more informal and opaque than the other two; a more formal, visible, 
bargaining phase; and an implementation phase aimed at promoting the operational realization 
of commitments made in the peace agreement. A peace process may begin informally but 
usually concludes formally at the elite level. In the case of civil wars, a peace process officially 
ends with the government and the nonstate actor or actors signing an agreement. 
 
Mediation 
“Mediation” is a nonadversarial process in which a third party shifts a dyadic system of conflict 
resolution to a triadic system to help disputing parties resolve their underlying 
incompatibilities. The process is distinct from the parties’ own efforts. Mediation occurs when 
disputing parties seek the assistance of or accept an offer of help from an individual, group, 
state, or organization to change, affect, or influence their perceptions or behavior without 
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law. Mediation usually takes place 
when the efforts of the disputing parties to resolve their disputes have failed.39 In this article, 
the term “peacemaking” is often used interchangeably with “mediation,” since most 




The range of peaceful dispute resolution methods is identified in Article 33 of the UN Charter. 
These methods include negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, the resort to regional agencies or arrangements, and other peaceful means of the 
parties’ choice. In this article, “peacemaking” is understood as the formal and informal 
diplomatic efforts of a third party using dialogue, mediation, and negotiation to prevent or 
resolve violent disputes. 
  
Mediator/Lead Mediator/Peacemaker 
This article uses the terms “mediator,” “lead mediator,” and “peacemaker” interchangeably to 
denote a high-ranking representative of a state, regional, or international organization or NGO, 
or a private individual functioning as a third party to help resolve a conflict. These mediators 
are also sometimes referred to as “special envoy,” or “facilitator.”  
 
A Note on Methods 
This research used a comparative case study to provide an understanding of how pure mediators 
conduct their peacemaking efforts. Semi-structured interviews were used to gather data, rather 
than tracing a small number of variables in a large study to ascertain how informality 
manifested and impacted peace processes.40 
The cases were drawn from three different parts of the world to allow the researchers to 
drawing generalizable conclusions that are not bound by cultural specificity. The selected cases 
allowed a controlled within-case analysis as well as structured comparative analysis between 
cases.41 The cases selected are all civil wars, because the asymmetry between state and nonstate 
actors made visible the level of formality between the state negotiators and the nonstate 
negotiators. The cases also had peacemaking teams that comprised a lead peacemaker and mid-
level and junior team members. The Aceh conflict in Indonesia had two distinct peace 
processes, both mediated by NGOs, and thus it provided a suitable within-case comparison. 
The other two cases, El Salvador and Sierra Leone, were processes led by the United Nations. 
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The mediators in all the cases did not resort to using leverage to coerce or induce disputing 
parties into settlements. 
The semi-structured, open-ended format of the interviews enabled the interview subjects 
to give first-hand accounts of historical events. These interviews allowed me to capture a “thick 
description” of how the mediation team established relationships with members of the 
disputing parties during the peace process.42 First-hand interviews were conducted with 
members of the mediation team and negotiators from the conflict parties to explore how 
informality permeates the peace processes conducted by pure mediators.43 
The format of the interviews also allowed participants in the peace process to freely 
express their views. At the end of each interview, the participants were given a summary and 
asked to confirm whether it matched their perception of reality.44 Interview content analysis 
was then conducted to identify common themes.45 I sought interviews, in particular, with senior 
advisors and experts, because these team members were able to influence the peacemaking 
team upward and downward while also having direct contact with the negotiators. 
Nonoperational junior staff who aided with research or note-taking and the administrative 
support personnel were not interviewed.46 The representatives of the disputing parties provided 
an account of how the mediators and their teams interacted with them and how that interaction 
affected their comfort and trust levels, the development of their ideas and thinking, and their 
overall confidence with the peacemaker and the peace process. I was able to interview the 
mediation team and representatives of the disputing parties in each of the peace processes under 
study. Triangulation of data using multiple narratives helped me secure an accurate and fair 
account of the peacemakers’ actions during the peace processes.47 
More than sixty people were interviewed for this research. Participants were interviewed 
until the data was saturated and good themes were easily identified.48 Data was reviewed 
repeatedly to ascertain whether the themes and explanations were logical.49 Data collection 
was stopped when additional interviews provided no new themes and few additional details to 
the narrative already constructed. The lists of questions posed to the mediation team and the 
disputants are presented in the Appendix. 
 
Notes on the Peace Processes 
This section provides a brief summary of the three cases: a narrative of the conflicts and a 
description of the parties to the dispute and the mediating team. The aim of this section is to 
present a broad context for the findings that follow in the next section. 
 
Aceh 
The province of Aceh is located at the northern tip of Sumatra, the largest island of the 
archipelagic state of Indonesia. The Acehnese conflict between the Government of Indonesia 
and the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) lasted for nearly three decades, from 1976 to 2005.50 
Three main factors account for the outbreak of the decades-long armed conflict between the 
Government of Indonesia and the GAM: the historical, linguistic, and religious identity of the 
Acehnese that dates from the Acehnese empire in the sixteenth century51; the discovery of 
liquefied natural gas in several parts of Aceh in 1971, as a result of which Aceh became one of 
the wealthiest provinces in Indonesia; and the brutal and repressive tactics of the Indonesian 
government and its military to maintain state security and protect its own economic and 
political interests. 
Shortly after the discovery of natural gas, the Acehnese began to resent how little they 
received of the financial returns it generated.52 That resentment and the actions of the 
government fueled a violent uprising in Aceh and inspired the separatist insurgency of the 
GAM.53 After waxing and waning for decades, the conflict came to a head at the end of the 
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Cold War with the fall of President Suharto in 1998 and the East Timor referendum in 1999. 
These events gave the GAM cause to believe that Indonesia was splintering from within and 
that its claim to self-determination through independence was within reach.54 
The Geneva-based Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) was the first 
organization to facilitate direct talks between the Government of Indonesia and the GAM.55 
The negotiation teams were led by Hassan Wirajuda, foreign minister of Indonesia, and Hassan 
di Tiro, the leader of GAM and “the Sultan of Aceh.” The peace process was led by Martin 
Griffiths and supported by Louisa Chan-Boegli and Andrew Marshall. According to Griffiths, 
Chan-Boegli initiated the preliminary interactions between the parties and traveled back and 
forth between Jakarta, Geneva, and Stockholm, where the GAM leadership resided in exile.56 
Chan-Boegli vividly recalls her first meeting with the former GAM premier minister Malik 
Mahmood at Changi Airport, Singapore. “We met at an airport restaurant and shared some 
fried rice! It was just so casual like we were old friends. We were able to talk just as easily 
about the food as about what an HD-led peace process would entail.”57 In contrast, though the 
setting of the Geneva talks, which were held in a palace, gave the GAM a sense of legitimacy 
and importance, she believed, it did not promote a convivial environment. 
Later Marshall supported Griffiths by meeting with some of the parties, including the 
generals from the Indonesian National Army (Tentera National Indonesia).58 Several rounds of 
talks in Geneva resulted in a humanitarian pause followed by the Cessation of Hostilities 
Agreement on December 9, 2002, more than a year later. When the humanitarian pause went 
into effect, HD deployed David Gorman to Banda Aceh to chair the meetings between the 
parties on humanitarian and security issues. Gorman recounted that once the pause had been 
initiated, he and the representatives of the parties who were negotiating in the humanitarian 
and security committees played badminton regularly. “It was a way for me to get to know them 
better,” he said, “but it also provided an activity that allowed them to increase their interaction 
with each other and enjoy each other’s company. It is more difficult to greet each other with 
animosity the next day when you have enjoyed time playing a sport together the previous 
day.”59 
After the signing of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, HD recruited and deployed 
former military officers from neighboring countries in the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations to help monitor the implementation of the agreement. The HD-led peace process 
formally ended on May 27, 2003, when the peace process broke down irrevocably, and the 
conflict reignited at full scale. 
In 2004, Juha Christensen, a Finish businessman living in Indonesia, informally initiated 
the second Aceh peace process. Christensen spoke Malay (Bahasa Indonesia) fluently, and 
because he had lived on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi, he had some familiarity with the 
local language and was able to gain access to the leaders of the Indonesian government, many 
of whom came from Sulawesi. In the early days, before the official Helsinki Peace Process for 
Aceh had started, Christensen often shared meals with the Acehnese, during which he and the 
Acehnese often talked about their culture, their history, and their aspirations for the future. 
These moments, according to Christensen, allowed him to get to know the parties and to 
demonstrate affinity and empathy with them. During these informal meeting, Christensen 
explained to GAM representatives about how difficult it would be to achieve their goals for a 
separate state when the international community did not support their independence. He 
believed these discussions helped prepare GAM for the reality of their situation and what they 
could achieve in the peace process. Christensen also recalls the hours of driving in cars with 
Farid Hussain, the informal mediator from the government side. 
When you are in a car for hours, you can talk about so many things. There is no 
agenda. It gives you a real opportunity to get to know your interlocutors and become 
friends. I still stay in close contact with Dr. Hussain.60  
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Christensen traveled back and forth between Banda Aceh and Jakarta and persuaded both 
parties to enter another round of talks under the formal mediation of Martti Ahtisaari, former 
president of Finland. At that time, Ahtisaari was leading a Finnish NGO called the Crisis 
Management Initiative (CMI). 
Once the formal Helsinki Peace Process started, Christensen stayed on to support 
Ahtisaari. As the “official unofficial mediator,”61 he chaired the unofficial sessions between 
the parties in Malay and interacted with many of the negotiators informally. Christensen 
notes that even government delegations have a “pecking order” and that informal interactions 
are often possible with members below the level of delegation head. 
They gain information, discuss ideas, and “unofficially” pass messages to you so that 
you can convey these messages to the lead peacemaker. Likewise, we do the same so 
that they can communicate our ideas to their head of delegation. Ideas and possible 
reactions to proposals get passed back and forth without any record, allowing everyone 
to adjust themselves before officially presenting proposals to the lead mediator during 
the bilateral/proximity talks or to the other side at the negotiating table. This way, there 
are no surprise bombshells for the peacemaker.62 
Later Christensen was joined by, among others, General Jaakko Oksanen from Finland.63 
Oksanen served as the military advisor to the mediator and helped to negotiate the military 
aspects of the agreement that emerged from the talks.64 He often used plain language with the 
negotiators, particularly those from the GAM, when discussing the terms and responsibilities 
of the military undertakings in the agreement.65 GAM, though functioning as a disciplined and 
trained armed group for decades, did not have the formal military training and terminology that 
the government side brought to the table. Oksanen used simple vocabulary to explain technical 
security issues to help GAM members comprehend their responsibilities and implement the 
agreement. 
At a critical point during the Helsinki Peace Process, Ahtisaari met President Yudhoyono 
and Vice President Kalla in Jakarta and presented them with evidence of military atrocities in 
an effort to persuade them to rein in the Indonesian military. While the meeting was respectful, 
the discussion was candid enough to ensure that the government could not claim ignorance.66 
The Helsinki Peace Process concluded with the signing of the 2005 Memorandum of 
Understanding. Minister of Law and Justice Hamid Awaludin signed on behalf of the 
Government of Indonesia, and Malik Mahmud signed on behalf of the GAM. The 




The conflict in El Salvador was rooted in socioeconomic inequities that gave rise to popular 
uprisings and the unchecked power of the military and security forces that emerged ostensibly 
in response to them.68 Ever since coffee became a major cash crop, well over a century before 
the official start of the civil war, and began bringing in 95 percent of the country’s income, El 
Salvador has been in a class struggle between peasants and landowners. During the years before 
the civil war began, coups and countercoups took place, with each regime promising to improve 
the economic conditions in the country. Discontent with the government grew when promises 
again and again were not met. 
Armed groups sprouted to oppose the government’s heavy-handed military actions against 
those who sought social reform. As human rights violations by government troops and death 
squads increased, a broad leftist coalition emerged in the country.69 Five armed groups formed 
a coalition known as the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) to intensify their 
efforts against the government.70 On March 24, 1980, when Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo 
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Romero, one of El Salvador’s most respected Roman Catholic Church leaders, was shot to 
death by gunmen as he celebrated Mass in San Salvador, El Salvador’s civil war officially 
began. 
Despite being called a civil war, the El Salvador conflict had irrefutable external 
dimensions. El Salvador was the final frontier of the Cold War. The East-West confrontation 
in El Salvador resulted in the US Government’s supporting the Government of El Salvador 
with military training, weapons, and financial aid ostensibly to fight Marxist guerrillas who 
were supported by Cubans and the Soviets.71 By the late 1980s, it was clear that the war was 
headed to a stalemate.72 
The first of several efforts to make peace in El Salvador was undertaken by the Catholic 
Church, the next by the Organization of American States (OAS). Each initiative brought a 
particular focus and benefit. The effort by the Church led to some humanitarian respite, while 
the effort by the OAS, in concert with the leadership of five Latin American states, resulted in 
the two Esquipulas Agreements, which created the regional conditions for peace.73 While 
providing a regional environment conducive to peace, the Esquipulas Agreements did not 
address the internal conflicts or bring the insurgent groups into the negotiations. In the end, 
neither the Church nor the OAS was successful in bringing peace to El Salvador. In September 
1989, the FMLN and the Salvadoran government, now led by Alfredo Cristiani of the Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) party, requested the good offices of the UN Secretary-
General to help resolve the conflict. 
The United Nation’s response to the request was the institution’s first foray as a 
peacemaker into a civil war. The UN Mediation Team was led by the UN Secretary-General’s 
Personal Representative for the Central American Peace Process, Alvaro de Soto, and 
supported by Deputy Francesc Vendrell, Special Assistant Blanca Antonini, and the human 
rights and legal advisor Pedro Nikken. In UN Headquarters, Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs Marrack Goulding and Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar kept a 
watchful eye, intervening when required.  
During the pre-negotiations phase, De Soto himself did much of the shuttle diplomacy 
between the parties in an effort to reach the initial framework agreement.74 Once the face-to-
face talks started, however, De Soto maintained his impartiality and limited his interactions 
with the dispute parties to chairing meetings, meeting parties in private talks, and managing 
official aspects of the peace process. Pedro Nikken did most of the initial agreement drafting.75 
Nikken spent a lot of time engaging informally with both parties. Often he would enjoy a glass 
of whisky or a cigar with his interlocutors while “talking shop” about the peace process.76 The 
FMLN negotiator Ana Guadeloupe Martinez acknowledges that the FMLN was extremely 
grateful to Pedro Nikken. According to Martinez, Nikken often helped to break down the 
technical legal and constitutional issues into “simple terms.” 77 FMLN negotiators had never 
governed before and were not familiar with some of the technical terminology. Hearing these 
concepts explained in plain language helped them to formulate their own positions and 
responses. Nikken also served as a go-between to Rodolfo Parker Soto, one of the lawyers in 
the government team, and the FMLN.78 Sanctioned by the UN Special Envoy, Nikken’s 
informal engagement helped produce the initial drafts of the agreements with a high degree of 
consensus even before they were tabled officially by the envoy to the parties. At the final stage 
of the peace process, Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar himself met with President 
Cristiani to gain final concessions from the government.79 
The UN-led peace process from 1990 to 1992 culminated in the Chapúltepec Accords, 
signed January 16, 1992, in Mexico City. The Minister of Justice, Oscar Santamaria, led the 
Government of El Salvador, and Commander Shafik Handal led the FMLN negotiating teams.  
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Sierra Leone  
In 1991, in an effort to address rampant corruption and the unequal distribution of resources 
from the diamond industry, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), an insurgent armed group, 
launched a war from the eastern border of Sierra Leone to overthrow the Government of Sierra 
Leone.80 The national army defended the government with assistance from the Military 
Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The 
ineffective response by the civilian government to the RUF, coupled with a disruption in 
diamond production, led to a coup by the Sierra Leone army in April 1992. The change of 
regime did not quell the RUF. Struggling to push back the rebels, the government invited 
mercenaries from a South African private military company, Executive Outcomes, to help 
defeat the RUF. As the civil war reached its peak in 1995, with severe abuses against civilians 
on both sides, Sierra Leone started to attract the attention of the wider international 
community. 
In November 1994, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone wrote to the UN 
Secretary-General, formally requesting that he facilitate negotiations between the government 
and the RUF. In February 1995, following an exploratory mission, the Secretary-General 
appointed Berhanu Dinka, a senior diplomat from Ethiopia, to be his Special Envoy.81 The 
process leading up to the agreement was conducted at the elite level. President Kabbah and the 
RUF leader Foday Sanko had several face-to-face meetings.82 Under strong international 
pressure from the United Nations, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the warring 
parties signed the Abidjan Accords in 1996. The agreement was short-lived. By May 1997, the 
Sierra Leonean army had joined forces with the RUF. Together they staged another coup and 
formed a ruling junta, known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. The coup forced 
President Kabbah and his government into exile in neighboring Guinea.83 
In September 1997, the UN Secretary-General appointed Francis G. Okelo, a Ugandan 
diplomat, as his Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, with a mandate to support ECOWAS in its 
efforts to reverse the situation in Sierra Leone.84 In October 1997, both parties signed the 
Conakry Peace Plan, which called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the 
reinstatement of the legitimate government of President Kabbah, within six months. This 
agreement, too, though negotiated at the top level of the parties, was short-lived. 
The US Government pressured Kabbah and the RUF through President Charles Taylor of 
Liberia to attend talks in Togo. In Lomé, the United States brokered a ceasefire agreement 
between Sierra Leone and the RUF in May 1999 as a sign of good faith to hold peace talks.85 
The Lomé Peace Talks were conducted under the aegis of the chairman of ECOWAS, President 
Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo. The talks continued for two more months, during which UN 
Special Envoy Okelo served as the day-to-day lead mediator under the authority of the 
ECOWAS chairman to help the parties reach a negotiated settlement. Okelo was supported by 
Modem Lawson-Betum, a senior political advisor, and Charles Anyidoho, a legal advisor. Both 
advisors supported the UN Envoy with the necessary political and legal advice, but they also 
engaged the parties informally at critical moments to gain information from and provide advice 
to the RUF.86 
During the Lomé peace talks on Sierra Leone, the legal advisor Anyidoho was able to 
spend unscheduled time with the RUF negotiation team. “These guys were young,” he said, 
“around the same age as me; we were from the same region. We shared a similar taste in 
music.”87 Anyidoho built a rapport with the negotiators between the formal sessions and in the 
evenings when they would simply talk about their favorite music. This rapport allowed the 
RUF negotiators to confide in Anyidoho and seek his legal advice regarding the terminology 
in the peace agreements. The RUF negotiating team had little experience or expertise in 
negotiations. Recognizing the value of this situation, Anyidoho requested permission from 
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Okelo to unofficially provide some capacity-building advice to the RUF. The advice helped 
the RUF to gain confidence to safeguard their interest during the negotiations. 
During the Sierra Leone peace process, Modem Lawson-Betum accompanied RUF leader 
Foday Sankoh on his flight from Freetown to Lomé. Lawson-Betum recalls that the flight 
provided an unprecedented opportunity for him to have an in-depth discussion with Sankoh: 
“It was during this flight that I discovered that Sankoh had absolutely no political ideology or 
vision for Sierra Leone. He was only seeking power for the sake of power.”88 Lawson later 
conveyed to the UN Envoy that Sankoh could be appeased only if he gained real power through 
the peace agreement. In the end, Sankoh settled for nothing less than becoming vice president 
and chairman of Board of Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National 
Reconstruction and Development.  
On July 7, 1999, the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone signed the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, which continues to provide the basis for the peace in Sierra Leone today. The 
government team was led by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice Solomon Barewa, 
while the RUF was led by its leader, Foday Sankoh. 
 
The Findings 
This study explored how informality manifested in peace processes conducted by pure 
mediators. In Aceh, the HD-led and the CMI-led teams employed a distinct informal process 
that supported the formal talks. In the El Salvador peace process, the technical expert created 
an informal layer that complemented the formal process. In the Lomé talks for Sierra Leone, 
the UN Special Envoy’s team functioned as an informal conduit for information and advice to 
complement the Envoy’s formal efforts. 
The research demonstrates that informality in a peace process manifests in four ways: 
informal people, informal spaces, informal language, and informal time. Together they provide 
the informal process where relationships are forged between the mediation team and the 
disputing parties to advance the formal peace process. 
 
Informal People 
The research found that lead peacemakers relied heavily on their team to engage disputing 
parties behind the scenes. Those teams had operational roles that brought them in contact with 
representatives of the disputing parties. This contact was regular and was undertaken without 
the presence of the lead mediator. During their interactions, members of the mediation team 
helped create a network of relationships that were based on mutual favors that could be called 
on to advance the lead mediator’s peacemaking efforts.89 
Without the diplomatic rank and the official status of the lead peacemaker, mid-level 
members of the peacemaking team functioned outside the formal realm of the peace process. 
These “informal people” gained the confidence of the parties and channeled information from 
the disputing parties to the lead peacemaker, enabling the peacemaker to get to know the parties 
beyond their positions at the negotiating table. Through these informal channels, disputing 
parties unofficially convey their vulnerabilities, their red lines in negotiations, and the real 
psychological cost of their concessions to the lead mediator.  
During the first peace process in Aceh, led by HD, Louisa Chang-Boegli and Andrew 
Marshall functioned as the informal people on the peacemaking team. In the second Aceh peace 
process, Juha Christensen and General Oksanen served in the same capacity. In the El Salvador 
peace process, Pedro Nikken, the UN legal advisor, was instrumental behind the scenes in 
engaging the parties, particularly with the FMLN, which had no legal advisor on its team. And 
in the UN-led Sierra Leone peace process, Charles Anyidoho, the UN legal advisor, served in 
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a similar capacity behind the scenes with the RUF. These informal people’s efforts were 
invisible and, for the most part, unrecorded.90 
During the research, negotiators from the disputing parties reported that members of the 
mediation team allowed them to discuss ideas and concerns about the process off-the-record. 
They carried on these discussions in part because they knew the mediation team members could 
influence the lead mediator by raising the appropriate issues and adjusting the process to move 
forward more productively. This finding coincides with Lederach’s finding that the mid-level 
has the most influence in a peacebuilding effort and Allport’s view that informal contact must 
be sanctioned.91 
The research found a distinction between how the state and the nonstate negotiators 
interacted with the peacemaking teams. The negotiating teams of the state actors preferred to 
deal directly with the lead mediators, while the negotiating teams of the nonstate actors were 
more at ease relating informally with members of the mediation team. These informal 
encounters afforded the representatives of nonstate actors opportunities to gain advice and to 
sound out ideas without divulging their lack of capacity or demonstrating their vulnerability to 
the official peacemakers. Nonstate actors preferred to meet with the lead mediators once they 
were more confident about and conversant with the issues. They treated meetings with the lead 
mediators, even in private sessions, as formal meetings. By engaging with the disputing parties 
informally and learning about their ideas and aspirations, fears and vulnerabilities, team 
members serving as informal mediators helped the lead mediators by enhancing progress 
during the formal process. 
The research also found that when peacemakers were dealing with elite state actors, formal 
interactions were particularly effective in gaining final concessions. Elite interaction in these 
instances should not be confused with power mediation. Neither President Ahtisaari nor 
Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar used or threatened to use any coercive action. Their ability 
to gain movement in the peace process demonstrates that equal status between the actors helped 
promote the more positive and productive interactions posited by social contact theory.92 
 
Informal Language 
Peace processes involve a high degree of diplomatic formality, which includes the use of 
diplomatic language during the talks. The language of diplomacy is designed to “minimise 
misunderstandings and miscalculations that give rise to conflict.”93 Diplomats tend to be so 
entrenched in civility, however, and intent on avoiding any disrespect that they often speak in 
a formal style that is polite, indirect, and often circuitous. In peace processes, rather than 
minimizing conflict, “diplomatic speak” can often exacerbate conflict and cause damaging 
delays. Formal diplomatic language can be intimidating, deceiving, and patronizing. The use 
of formal language by state actors and the lead mediator can give the impression that the real 
issues are being avoided or that the speakers are trying to deceive those who do not have the 
education to understand.  
In civil war mediation, nonstate actors are often represented by nonelites who do not have 
the education and experience of the state actors. Disputing parties often block the peace process 
when they feel patronized or they suspect the other side of trickery or deceit. Once experts 
helped to break down technical concepts into plain language, however, these same nonstate 
representatives became more productive in the talks. The peacemakers’ use of informal 
language and simple terms to clarify some of the highly technical concepts and vocabulary 
used in the drafting of peace agreements proved essential to their gaining and building the 
confidence of the disputing parties, particularly the nonstate actors.  
In this research, informal language appeared as slang, metaphors, storytelling, emotional 
discussions, and jokes. The use of humor, particularly when well-timed, can help conflict 
parties alter their usual patterns of behavior and communication.94 Engaging in discussions 
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with emotional content and expressing feelings through the use of verbal and nonverbal cues 
helps the mediation team understand the disputing parties’ states of mind and thus to better 
represent their needs during the peace process.95 An informal style of language facilitates more 
personal and confidential discussions during peace talks.96  
The research also found that the use of the parties’ vernacular language created a sense of 
familiarity between the disputing parties and the mediation team. In three out of the four peace 
processes studied, the mediation team members were able to communicate with the parties in 
the vernacular. Informality through the use of vernacular language added a level of comfort 
and relational confidence between the disputing parties and the mediation team.  
In peace processes, formal language can cause confusion, conflict, and class tensions.97 
This research found that when informality manifested through language, it helped to overcomes 
these challenges in a peace process. Research by Sillars and Wilmot supports the finding of 
this study that an effective communication strategy in a peace process provides space for the 
mediation team and the disputing parties to abandon diplomatic and technical jargon in favor 
of plain language.98  
 
Informal Space 
Peace processes require spaces that promote organic interaction. In the case studies, these 
spaces were often the coffee-break venues. The informality of these spaces allowed the 
negotiators to relax and engage in conversations without the perception of their being on-the-
record. According to the finding, however, not all meal venues were conducive to intimate 
discussions. Some meals were held in the formal setting of a hotel restaurant. And though the 
conversations were casual, the atmosphere was too formal or contrived to be useful in 
promoting meaningful dialogue. According to Brewer and Gaertner, casual conversation alone 
is insufficient; a situation must provide intimacy to be an avenue for meaningful conversation.99 
Spaces that were more casual and intimate and less contrived provided the intimacy that 
facilitated more open communications. 
The idea that informal space is conducive to deal making is not new. In the United Nations, 
deal making is so pervasive in the delegates lounge that UN diplomats commonly refer to the 
lounge as the “7th Committee.”100 Delegations often use the many corridors, lounges, bars, and 
cafés in and around the UN headquarters to hold informal negotiations. This research indicates 
that the quality of communication is enhanced when the space is informal and has a relaxed, 
quiet, and private ambiance that provides a perception of safety in which personal and off-the-
record conversations can be held. These spaces include bars, cafés, restaurants, secluded 
corridors, planes, trains, and automobiles, and any other space where one is assured of privacy 
and is not bound by rules of formal behavior or the expectation that one will act and speak in 
an official capacity. 
Many of the most pivotal conversations in the peace processes examined in this study were 
held in informal spaces where parties felt comfortable and unguarded where discussions were 
genuine exchanges of ideas. Informal spaces that promote confiding, act like “safe spaces” and 
“enhance the quality of the discussions.”101 
  
Informal Time 
Informality also manifested in peace processes as time spent with disputants engaging in 
activities that were not related to the peace process. Peace processes are often denoted by the 
time pressure to reach an agreement that will end violence. Mediation teams may find it hard 
to consider spending time in pleasurable activities under such pressure. Informal time, 
however, is often unscheduled and has no agenda, time constraint, or deadline. Spending 
informal time with the parties conveys the message that the mediation team is genuinely 
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interested in getting to know them as individuals and to fully understand the situation rather 
than rushing the job just to gain a success. 
In the cases studied, the mediation team members identified going for a walk or a drive, 
playing chess and other sports, and sharing a traditional meal with a family as examples of how 
they spent informal time with the parties. They described informal time as having the quality 
of being purposeless yet providing comradery. According to the members of the disputing 
parties, discussions that are held during informal times were often not focused on topics 
pertaining to the peace processes, nor did it seem that the members of the mediation team were 
pursuing an objective. The parties talked, for example, about their families or music and other 
hobbies. The mutually rewarding and pleasurable activities engaged in during informal time 
created a relaxed atmosphere of familiarity between the mediation team and the disputing 
parties. The cases revealed that mediation team members who spent informal time with the 
parties were often able to build a rapport with them and gain their confidence, allowing them 
to explore new ideas and ways of looking at the conflict issues without fear. 
The idea that relationships can be improved between hostile parties through pleasurable 
activities is consistent with previous research on contact theory.102 This study reveals that when 
members of the peacemaking team spent informal time with the disputing parties, without 
having an agenda beyond getting to know them, they were able to build a rapport with them 
and gain their confidence. The finding in this study that informal time provides the opportunity 
to hold unstructured conversations also resembles the finding in Kelman’s study of problem-
solving workshops, which facilitate the exploration of ideas between influential people who 
are open to talking and listening.103 
 
Informal Mediator 
On occasion, experienced members of the mediation team facilitated contact between the 
disputing parties to reduce hostility and improve relations between them.104 Acting as informal 
mediators, they systematically facilitated relationship building and bargaining with and 
between the parties to advance the goals of the peace process. In most instances, the mediation 
team members were sanctioned by the lead mediator to go back and forth between the parties 
on an informal level. In other instances, the senior staff initiated informal interactions to build 
closer relationships with the parties on their own initiative. The information and outcomes from 
these initiatives were later fed back to the lead mediator and the formal process. 
Informal mediators in a mediation team are usually senior members of the peacemaking 
team. They may be political advisors or technical experts who have a thorough knowledge of 
the ongoings of the peace process at the formal level and work closely with the lead 
peacemaker. Though they do not hold decision-making authority in the formal peace process, 
they are able to exert influence upward on the lead peacemaker’s strategic direction and 
policies and downward on the operational and administrative functions of the team. 
Informal mediators are recognized by the parties as close associates of the lead mediator. 
They worked invisibly in the background on behalf of the lead peacemakers. Disputing parties 
perceived informal mediators as being able to influence the lead peacemaker. They unofficially 
passed messages and ideas from the parties to the lead peacemaker, while retaining the capacity 
to hold in confidence what the parties did not wish to share with the lead peacemaker. Informal 
mediators also served as catalysts for fermenting ideas with the parties and empowering them 
to think strategically for themselves with a view to advancing the overall goals of the peace 
process as defined by the lead peacemaker. The behind-the-scenes efforts of these informal 
mediators complemented the diplomatic efforts of the lead peacemaker in the formal peace 
process. 
The informal mediators in the peace processes were often mid-level members of the 
mediation team who had the access and the ability to influence the lead mediator. The informal 
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mediator serves in a sanctioned but casual capacity to build bridges between the parties. 
Political advisors and technical experts serve as informal mediators when they chair meetings, 
conduct brainstorming sessions, and shuttle back and forth while drafting the initial drafts of 
the agreement. This finding coincides with Lederach’s pyramidal model, according to which 
the mid-level of society is seen as having the greatest potential to influence change.105 
In all the cases studied, however, the informal process was not established from the outset 
as part of the overall process design; it was created intuitively by team members. The findings 
suggest that the informal process emerged because of a shared culture and relatability between 
the members of the mediation team and the disputing parties. In the Aceh case, Chan-Boegli 
was an Asian from Hong Kong who shared cultural nuances with the Indonesians. Christenson 
spoke Bahasa fluently and was culturally adept in Indonesia having lived there for a long time. 
In the Sierra Leone case, Anyidoho and Lawson-Betum were both from West Africa. Their 
native countries’ developmental challenges, the consequences of colonialism, were much like 
those in Sierra Leone. Anyidoho was similar in age to the nonstate actor and shared the same 
language and interests. In The El Salvador case, Antonini and Nikken were Argentinian and 
Venezuelan, respectively, and understood the politics of military dictatorships. These factors 
indicate that a shared historical, cultural, and language affinity and a social personality are 
useful in constructing the informal process. 
 
Conceptualizing a Peace Process 
Extending Lederach’s pyramidal model, Figure 1 depicts a peace process conceptualized as an 
interactive system that comprises a formal and an informal process. 
  Figure 1. A peace process depicted as an interactive system 
 
Formal Peace Process 
The formal peace process encompasses official positions, demands, offers, concessions, and 
decisions. It usually takes place in formal and ceremonial settings where the code of 
conduct/behavior requires representatives to function in their official capacity and to act in a 
formal manner, using language that is official and diplomatic. The formal peace process 
legitimizes informal and formal deals. It is usually concluded by a public event that produces 
some form of official declaration or signed agreement. The formal peace process also includes 
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the efforts by the lead mediator to engage the disputing parties in exploration and bargaining 
discussions by shuttling back and forth between them and holding private sessions. 
 
Informal Process 
Drawing from previous research on multitrack diplomacy, contact theory, and conflict 
transformation theory, the informal process within a peace process can be conceptualized as an 
unofficial progression of bargaining that takes place during unstructured activities in informal 
settings during the course of unofficial activities. The informal process take place between 
representatives of the disputing parties and members of the mediating team who can influence 
the official peace process and have the time and space to speak in confidence, without inciting 
fear or acrimony, to delve into the underlying issues in a conflict and explore new ideas to 
advance the formal process.106 Participants in the informal process meet each other as equals 
and are not affected by the power imbalances and moral righteousness that often permeate the 
formal process. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This research sought to understand how pure mediators conduct peacemaking at the granular 
level. I argue that an informal process is an essential aspect of how peacemakers without power 
advance the goals of the peace process. Relatedly, I suggest that the formal and informal 
process are complementary and that pure peacemakers use informality to create the conditions 
for relationship building in peace processes. Data was drawn from three cases that included 
four peace processes to explore how pure mediators build relationships of trust in peace 
processes. A set of questions were used to ascertain how informality manifested in peace 
processes conducted by pure mediators. 
The findings of this research support the central argument of this article. There is strong 
evidence to suggest that pure mediators relied on informality to build relationships with the 
disputing parties. This study demonstrated that pure mediators intuitively constructed the peace 
processes in two layers: a formal and an informal process. The formal process was conducted 
by the lead mediator with the main negotiators of the disputing teams and was the more public 
part of the peace process. The informal process was conducted by members of the lead 
peacemaker’s team who served as mediators behind the scenes. The informal process created 
an atmosphere that encouraged discussions of the hidden issues that underlie difficult deep 
conflicts. 
Informality helped the mediation team get to know the disputing parties by meeting with 
them in social settings, where they treated them as equals and enjoyed their company and 
culture. The relaxed and casual atmosphere of these settings and the mediators’ use of plain 
language allowed the parties to express themselves freely and divulge concerns they would 
otherwise not share with the lead mediator (or the other side) for fear that their vulnerabilities 
would be used against them. These informal gatherings helped the mediators forge settlements 
that not only met the parties’ interests but also satisfied their psychological needs. Information 
gained unofficially, however, was brought to the attention of the lead mediator and deals made 
informally were legitimized in the formal process. The informal process thus complements and 
supports the lead mediator’s efforts in the formal process. 
The literature has understood the term “track 2” to refer to an informal track of diplomacy 
that involves unofficial actors, mainly NGOs. This research found that both track 1 and track 
2 actors conducted an informal process within a peace process. If an informal process were 
simply an issue of unofficial actors serving as mediators in a peace process, peace processes 
led by NGOs would not have an informal process. The findings of this research indicate, 
however, that even peace processes led by NGOs have an informal layer. Thus, discussions of 
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the formal and informal process should not be about which mediating entity should conduct it, 
that is, official actors (states and international organizations) as opposed to unofficial actors 
(NGOs), but how it should be conducted and the characteristics and status of individual 
mediators. As the second Aceh peace process in Helsinki demonstrated, a peace process led by 
an NGO headed by a former president was still perceived by the parties as a formal process. 
Thus, the Helsinki Peace Process benefited from having an informal process with a lower-
status mediator. 
Overall, the findings demonstrate that there was larger space for an informal process 
before an official mandate was received for mediation. This conclusion is consistent with track 
2 literature that finds that unofficial actors can play a useful role during the pre-negotiation 
phase.107 It is important to note, however, that in all cases the informal process continued once 
official talks started and provided significant depth during the official peace process. 
In the cases studied, male and female members of the peacemaking team were found to be 
equally capable of undertaking the informal process. This finding is consistent with previous 
research.108 Male and female colleagues, however, were not equally visible at the formal or the 
informal processes. Female mediators were completely missing in the formal processes in all 
the cases examined and had only a pivotal role in the informal process in one of the four peace 
processes that was examined. In keeping with UN Security Council resolution 1325, more 
effort is needed to increase women mediators in formal and informal peacemaking. 
An informal process worked best in exchanges where the status of a mediation team 
member matched that of the disputing party. The research found that nonstate actors responded 
better in discussions with lower-status team members. In contrast, state actors considered it 
diplomatic protocol and a sign of respect that their high status was equally matched by the 
mediation team. Meetings with the state actors were therefore often conducted by the lead 
mediator and thus were more formal. Practitioners may need to consider assigning a deputy 
mediator with a sufficiently high status to interact informally with the state actor. 
Lead mediators could argue that they alternate their own style between a formal and 
informal approach and therefore informal mediators are not necessary. Lead mediators often 
use bilateral sessions to speak privately with each side between forum sessions.109 Though 
these bilateral discussions offer privacy and confidentiality, they are still official. Parties rarely 
confide their real fears and vulnerabilities to the lead peacemaker, even in private sessions. As 
Chataway points out, “diplomats and government officials can never fully abandon their 
official positions or relinquish their formality to be able to hold open and unstructured 
conversations that can facilitate creative thinking.”110 The research suggests that an informal 
process could provide peacemakers with an avenue to get to the heart of the issues that prevent 
mediations from reaching a settlement. 
This research indicates that peace processes conducted by pure mediators, regardless of 
whether they are official or unofficial actors, usually incorporated an informal process that 
complemented and supported the formal process. The research, however, examined only peace 
processes mediated by pure mediators. An avenue for further research could be to ascertain 
whether informality also manifests in peace processes led by power mediators. In addition, 
research on frozen conflicts could provide greater insight on the impact of informality on the 
trajectory of a peace process. Stalled peace processes that reignite and progress with increased 
informality could provide confirmation that informality should be more consciously integrated 
into peace process designs. 
In summary, this research demonstrates that pure mediators often employ informality to 
create the atmospheric conditions for building relationships in their peacemaking efforts. A 
well-designed informal process can help peacemakers build closer relationships with the 
parties and help them find their way out of the entrenched, harmful patterns of thinking and 
behavior that led to their continued conflictual relations. In this research informality helped the 
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peacemaking team relate to disputing parties as human beings and build relationships that 
advanced the peace processes. 
According to Bercovitch, “mediation is a social role requiring a set of skills. Like other 
social roles it can be learned, developed, and improved.”111 This research provides practitioners 
with insight on how to operationalize informality, create an informal layer within a peace 
process, and enhance their social role as mediators. The findings of this research will make a 
theoretical contribution to mediation literature on pure mediation. In addition, practitioners and 
policymakers may find this research useful in determining how they select and structure 
peacemaking teams and design peace processes. 
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Appendix 
Questions Asked of the Mediation Team  
1. What was your role and influence level during the peace process?  
2. How did you interact with the disputing parties? 
3. Can you describe these interactions; how did these interactions take place, when and 
where, and what was discussed?  
4. How did you plan for these interactions?  
5. How did your interactions shape your ability to influence the parties?  
6. How would you describe your style of interaction?  
7. How would you describe your relationship with members of the disputing parties at the 
beginning and at the end of the process? 
8. Was this relationship important for the advancement of the peace process? Why? 
 
Questions Asked of Negotiators 
1. What was your role and influence level in the peace process? 
2. What was your interaction with the peacemaker and his team?  
3. Can you describe how, when and where you met the peacemaker/the team, and how 
things were discussed? 
4. How did you plan for these interactions/meetings?  
5. How did these interactions help shape your views during the peace process?  
6. How would you describe the peacemaking team’s style of interaction?  
7. How would you describe your relationship with members of the peacemaking team at 
beginning and the end of the process? 
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